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INTRODUCTION

On February 8, 2007, Anna Nicole Smith, a model and former Playboy
Playmate, died.1 She left behind an infant daughter, and at least two
different men quickly claimed paternity in hopes of taking part in the multimillion-dollar inheritance that the baby will receive one day.2 Further
complicating the matter, one potential father of Smith’s baby claimed he
was Smith’s husband and had raised the baby as his own since her mother’s
death.3
Despite the incredible media spectacle surrounding Smith’s death and
her child’s questioned paternity, the issue raised is hardly unique in modern
America.4 A recent report noted that the number of DNA tests ordered to
determine paternity has more than quadrupled during the past twenty
years.5 As relationships between mothers and fathers become less
permanent, questions of paternity occur more frequently, increasing the
need for legal adjudication of the issue.6
1. See, e.g., Suzette Laboy, Sudden, Early End to a Tabloid Life: Anna Nicole
Smith Dies at 39 in Florida, N.J. REC., Feb. 9, 2007, at A8.
2. See John Hayes, Anna Nicole Smith Dies at 39: Implausible Life of Celebrity
Ends with Collapse in Florida Hotel, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 9, 2007, at A1
(reporting that despite Howard K. Stern’s name on the girl’s birth certificate, at least
one other man claimed paternity, and also suggesting that the baby’s large inheritance
drove the men’s frenzy to claim her as theirs).
3. See Robert Nolin, A Showgirl and Her Demons, HERALD SUN (Austl.), Feb. 10,
2007, at 4 (adding that Stern and Smith exchanged vows and publicly expressed their
commitment to each other during a ceremony, although it was not legally binding).
4. See Kathryn Masterson, Growth of Paternity Tests Sires Tricky Societal Issues,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 2007, at 1 (describing the more than two-fold increase in DNA
tests between 1994 and 2004, and implying that more frequent paternity disputes
contributed to the increasing number of DNA tests).
5. See Gail Rosenblum, Paternity Tests Not Just for Rich, Famous, ALBANY
TIMES UNION, Mar. 25, 2007, at G5 (mentioning that men order the tests both to prove
and disprove paternity).
6. See Hannah Davies, Now More Men Ask, Who’s The Daddy?, LEICESTER
MERCURY (Eng.), June 21, 2005, at 3 (arguing that paternity is questioned more
commonly because relationships between men and women have become more unstable
and temporary).
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This Comment argues that state paternity laws frequently fail to act in
children’s best interests because they permit excessive judicial discretion,
avoid compulsory lists of factors, and allow dual paternity. Part II details
the history of the “best interests of the child” standard, the British origins
of American paternity law, and current approaches to regulating fatherhood
in the United Kingdom, California, and Louisiana. Part III argues that
excessive judicial discretion, a lack of compulsory factors to consider, and
dual paternity fail to protect children’s interests. Part IV compiles lessons
learned from the states and the United Kingdom to recommend that state
policy should include a clear presumption of paternity and that judges
should evaluate cases more carefully. Part V concludes that states can best
protect children’s interests by updating their laws’ clarity.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Introduction to Family Law, the “Best Interests of the Child” Standard,
and Paternity Presumptions
Family law cases involving children operate under a single guiding
principle: children’s well-being is the paramount concern in any judge’s
decision.7 Because family law falls under the control of the states, and not
the federal government, states and courts articulate the standard
differently.8 Like the best interests standard, laws governing unwed
fathers’ rights originated in the British legal system and initially developed
out of the need to shield children from the legal and social consequences of
their parents’ indiscretions.9 Many years later, legal scholars developed the
Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”) to guide state legislatures, encourage
uniformity of outcomes in parentage cases, and better protect the interests
of children.10

7. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 115 (1989) (adding that courts
sometimes appoint psychologists to determine what constitutes acting in a child’s best
interests).
8. See Masterson, supra note 4, at 1 (citing the confusing “legal thicket” of
paternity laws that has resulted from widely variant state procedures governing how to
contest paternity).
9. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 197, 218 (UNC Press 1985) (citing the consequences
of naming a child a “bastard,” including social ostracism and denial of legal benefits
like inheritance rights).
10. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (2002) (implying that concern over
children’s suffering, when states deem them illegitimate, motivated the committee to
modify the UPA).
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1. The “Best Interests of the Child” Standard
The “best interests of the child” doctrine requires that courts rule in
whatever manner best advances the child’s position.11 Despite the
relatively straight-forward definition, the standard varies widely depending
on the state in which the family law case is brought and which judge hears
the case.12
American courts have used the best interests standard since at least 1815,
when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. Addicks
that two children should remain with their mother after her divorce because
they would fare best under her care.13 However, early American courts
faced conflicting concerns; although they wanted to protect children’s
needs, they also hesitated to override fathers’ wishes when they advocated
for custody.14 Increasing rights for women further illuminated the gender
implications of such concerns.15
2. History of Fatherhood Presumptions
Family law is rooted in the British system, and therefore an examination
of paternity presumptions properly begins in the United Kingdom.16
Historically, British law included a legitimacy presumption that was
exceedingly difficult to overcome.17 To overcome the presumption, a
11. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 170 (8th ed. 2004) (adding that courts may also
consider previous relationships that men have had with the child and, if he or she is old
enough, the child’s wishes).
12. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 2004) (requiring a judge’s
consideration of the child’s wishes if the child is of sufficient age), with HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 571-46(7), (9) (LexisNexis 2007) (mandating a judge to consider the
presence or absence of domestic violence when assigning custody in divorce
situations).
13. See 2 Serg. & Rawle 174, 174 (Pa. 1815) (admitting that given the girls’ ages
of seven and ten-years old, they would be cared for best by their mother, but also
berating the mother for causing the divorce by having an extramarital affair). The girls
were nine and thirteen at the time of the 1815 case, but the decision allowing the
mother to retain custody occurred two to three years prior. Id.
14. See Prather v. Prather, 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des. Eq.) 33, 34 (S.C. 1809) (debating
over whether the father—the children’s natural guardian—should be denied custody
absent evidence of gross misconduct or abuse, because the laws of God and the country
invest him with the right to raise his children).
15. See GROSSBERG, supra note 9, at 235, 238 (describing the conflict between a
father’s historical authority over his family and the emerging acceptance of women as
legally significant and distinct players in custody disputes, and connecting the debate
over women’s rights with the campaign for maternal rights).
16. See Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31,
53 (2006) (describing how family law was one type of English law that early American
courts accepted because colonists brought their legal system with them to America).
17. See GROSSBERG, supra note 9, at 197, 201 (implying the reason behind the
strongly-rooted legitimacy presumption was the important government interest in
strong families, particularly concerning costs to the public and the well-being of
bastard children).
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father had to demonstrate that he was outside the United Kingdom
(“beyond the four seas”) for more than nine months during the time in
which his wife conceived.18 However, this outcome carried different
connotations than it would today, including the designation filius nullius, or
child of no one.19 If the court found the father to have not fathered his
wife’s child, the court declared that child “illegitimate” and therefore
subject to harsh treatment by the government.20
Fortunately, early American laws began to treat illegitimate children and
their parents more compassionately than British laws, and public
perception of these children softened.21 By the advent of DNA testing in
the 1970s, illegitimate children had lost much of their historical stigma.
State laws shifted their focuses toward the protection of fathers’ rights and
children’s best interests, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the
children’s births.22
The case Michael H. v. Gerald D., in which two California men disputed
the paternity of a child, represents one key development in the
establishment of legal paternity and its relation to biological
determinations.23 Justice Scalia, who wrote the Supreme Court’s majority
opinion, upheld the California law that presumes that a man living with the
mother at the time of a child’s birth is the child’s legal father.24 Ultimately,
the Court found that the mother’s husband, Gerald D., was the only person
with a claim to legal fatherhood, despite convincing biological evidence
that another man, Michael H., fathered the married couple’s child.25
18. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES 434, 443 (requiring that the husband
have no possible access to the mother to demonstrate the impossibility of his paternity).
19. See GROSSBERG, supra note 9, at 197, 233 (describing the downfall of the
crippling filius nullius designation in the twentieth century, and subsequent expansion
of children’s rights).
20. See id. (adding that a bastard child could not obtain the same legal relations of
inheritance, maintenance, and custody with his or her parents as legitimate children,
and that illicit couples had no rights regarding their illegitimate children).
21. See Hartwell v. Jackson, 7 Tex. 576, 578 (1852) (holding that children’s rights
are independant of their status as bastards or legitimate offspring of married parents
because they are unaware of the crime that their parents committed).
22. See GROSSBERG, supra note 9, at 231 (describing a typical incarnation of a
state’s illegitimacy laws as safeguarding against blackmail and protecting paternal
rights).
23. See 491 U.S. 110, 115 (1989) (detailing the issue at hand as relating to the
California presumption that a child born to a woman who is living with her husband at
the time of birth is the product of that marriage and therefore the offspring of the
husband).
24. See id. at 131 (reasoning that although an adult contesting parentage already
has caused a disruption in family stability, allowing the child to bring an illegitimacy
claim would disrupt the family more).
25. See Adam K. Ake, Unequal Rights: The Fourteenth Amendment and De Facto
Parentage, 81 WASH. L. REV. 787, 798 (2006) (implying that Michael H. effectively
ruled that unless fathers are married to their biological child’s mother, they cannot
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3. The Uniform Parentage Act
Another key development in paternity law was an attempt to promote
equality for all children, regardless of their parents’ marital status, through
the creation of the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”).26 The UPA is a model
statute originally developed in 1973 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and reworked in 2000 to reflect
changes in society.27 Many states have adopted the UPA, incorporating
some or all of its guidelines into their existing family law statutes.28
Originally, scholars created the UPA because the Supreme Court
declared many state paternity laws unconstitutional.29 Of those allowed to
remain, state laws governing paternity differed dramatically in their
treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children.30 The original UPA also
introduced the description “child with no father,” in an attempt to
encourage a more enlightened approach to such children.31
B. Approaches to Regulating Unwed Fathers’ Legal Status in the United
Kingdom, California, and Louisiana
1. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has moved far beyond its original presumptions of
legitimacy and into a body of law more grounded in the reality of family
situations.32 In particular, the influential Children Act 1989 represented the
drastic changes in how the United Kingdom handled increasingly complex
family situations.33
The Act introduces the concept of parental
petition for elevated status in the eyes of the court).
26. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (2002) (stating the UPA’s original
purpose to protect the equality of all children regardless of parental status and
eliminating the use of the term “illegitimate”).
27. See id. (citing significant scientific advances in genetic testing as a reason to
update the UPA, and expressing hope that the new UPA will better address modern
families’ situations).
28. See Veronica Sue Gunderson, Personal Responsibility In Parentage: An
Argument Against the Marital Presumption, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 335, 340
(2007) (noting that as of the summer of 2007, eighteen states had adopted the original
UPA: Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode
Island, Washington, and Wyoming).
29. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (2002).
30. See id. (justifying the need for a uniform act because the idea of legal equality
for all children was revolutionary at the time).
31. See id.
32. See Liz Trinder & Michael E. Lamb, Measuring Up? The Relationship Between
Correlates of Children’s Adjustment and Both Family Law and Policy in England, 65
LA. L. REV. 1509, 1524 (2005) (describing the foundation of the Children Act 1989 as
resting on principles of child psychology).
33. See N.V. Lowe, The Allocation of Parental Rights and Responsibilities—The
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responsibility for children and automatically assigns responsibility to
unmarried fathers who jointly register a child’s birth with the mother.34 It
also reflected the country’s strong disinclination for the courts to intervene
in family matters unless absolutely necessary and preference that families
resolve their disputes without the court’s input.35 The Children Act 1989,
as amended in 2002 by the Adoption and Children Act, details ways in
which an unmarried father can establish himself as his child’s legal parent,
such as through a responsibility order.36 These methods, however, have
limitations: a responsibility order, for example, exists only to grant a father
responsibility when he seeks it and can be taken away by the courts at their
discretion.37
2. California
The complexity of California’s parentage laws lies in overlapping
conclusive and rebuttable presumptions of paternity; moreover, even the
conclusive presumption is rebuttable to an extent.38 The conclusive
presumption states that the child of a married woman living with her
husband—who is not impotent or sterile—is the husband’s child.39 A
number of people, however, can use blood tests to disprove this conclusive
presumption, including the mother’s husband, a man who is a presumed
father under the rebuttable presumption, or the birth mother herself.40
Position in England and Wales, 39 FAM. L.Q. 267, 267 (2005) (citing, as an example of
the significant effect the Children Act 1989 had on English law, the replacement of the
ad hoc approach to family law with a cohesive, well-organized approach capable of
encouraging uniformity).
34. See Trinder & Lamb, supra note 32, at 1524 (highlighting the importance of
children’s relationships with both parents as the reason behind the emphasis on both
parents’ responsibility).
35. See id. at 1525 (citing potential harm to children as a situation in which courts
could intervene).
36. See Lowe, supra note 33, at 270 (noting that, to establish paternity, a father
can: (1) register himself as the father (with the mother’s permission), (2) enter into a
formal parental responsibility agreement with the mother, (3) receive a court-created
parental responsibility order in his favor, or (4) receive a court-created residence order
in his favor).
37. See id. at 271.
38. See Anthony Miller, Baseline, Bright-line, Best Interests: A Pragmatic
Approach for California to Provide Certainty in Determining Parentage, 34
MCGEORGE L. REV. 637, 639 n.5 (2003) (observing that the presumed father, the
child’s mother, and the presumed father under section 7611 may rebut the so-called
conclusive presumption; furthermore, even a biological father may not rebut the
presumption unless he is also a presumed father); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540
(West 2004) (stating that unless a mother’s husband is impotent or sterile, he is her
child’s legal father).
39. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (noting that the presumption does not violate the
rights of the biological father).
40. See Miller, supra note 38, at 644 (adding that a child’s biological unwed father,
who never had the opportunity to raise the child, would be unable to rebut the
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California’s rebuttable presumption, modeled on the UPA, states that a
court presumes that a man is the biological father of a child if: (1) the man
and the natural mother are or were married, and the child was born either
during their marriage or within three-hundred days after they divorced;
(2) the man married or attempted unsuccessfully to marry the child’s
mother before or after the child’s birth, and he is named the child’s father
on the birth certificate voluntarily or is obligated by the court to pay child
support; or (3) the man raises the child in his home and holds the child out
to society as his own.41 The law also cites loose guidelines for which
presumption controls if two or more presumptions conflict.42
Likewise, the comparable section in the UPA (2000) presumes a man to
be the father if: (1) he is married to the mother at the time of the child’s
birth, (2) the child was born within three-hundred days after the man’s
marriage to the child’s mother ended, (3) the man and the mother attempted
to marry before the child’s birth, or (4) the man married the child’s mother
after the child’s birth and voluntarily asserted paternity.43 California’s
legislature modeled the rebuttable presumptions after those found in the
UPA, although notably lacking a time frame for how long a man must
claim a child as his own in order for him to become a presumed father.44
3. Louisiana
Demonstrating a different approach to updating parentage laws in light
of changing times, Louisiana recently became the first state to allow
children to have two legal fathers.45 In Smith v. Cole, the Louisiana
presumption).
41. See id. at 650-51 (adding that the reasoning behind these restrictions is the need
to perpetuate the parent-child relationship, which imposes rights and obligations on
parents).
42. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (favoring the presumption that is “grounded on
the weightier considerations of policy and logic” as the controlling presumption).
43. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt. (2002) (citing similarities between UPA
(2000) and UPA (1973) on this point, but also noting that UPA (2000) does not include
a presumption of paternity for the man who holds a child out as his own).
44. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (requiring only that a man hold the child
out as his own and in his home, but not specifying a length of time for which the child
must live with him), with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 204 cmt. (explaining the reasons
for including a time frame as: (1) clarifying confusion caused by UPA (1973), which
lacked a time frame and could have been interpreted in widely variant ways; and
(2) matching a similar requirement for married men in order to ensure equal treatment
of married and unmarried couples’ children).
45. See, e.g., Geen v. Geen, 666 So. 2d 1192, 1197 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (awarding
two men paternity rights, although the mother’s ex-husband, the legal father, was
awarded domiciliary custody of the child and the mother’s current husband, with whom
the mother had an affair and who was the child’s biological father, received visitation
privileges); see also Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and
Social Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 853 (2006) (describing Louisiana’s policy of
allowing both biological and “social” fathers to have simultaneous legal rights to raise
a child, although technically one father is named the primary caregiver and the other
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Supreme Court held that courts may presume a child’s mother’s husband to
be the child’s legal father, while courts may also recognize the biological
father as the child’s actual father.46 Dual paternity allows for the court to
assign one father parental rights at birth and to assign a second man similar
rights if DNA tests prove his paternity.47 Moreover, Louisiana requires in
such cases that both legal fathers support their child financially.48 The
Smith court cited the unfairness in permitting a biological father to escape
his child support obligations simply because another man had raised the
child and therefore became the child’s legal father.49 Louisiana’s approach
reflects how America’s definition of what constitutes a family has adapted
beyond a traditional two-parent household.50
III. ANALYSIS
A. State Laws on Paternity Should Respond to Evolving Family
Structures
States that properly follow the best interests standard reasonably modify
their laws and practices to reflect new types of family arrangements, while
other states fail to consider the interests of children by retaining outdated
laws and practices.51 Although states must guard against dramatically
changing their laws at the slightest shift in societal circumstances, they fail
to adequately protect children’s best interests if they do not ensure that
their laws accurately reflect the current composition of their citizens’
families.52
holds a less substantial role in the eyes of the court).
46. 553 So. 2d 847, 854-55 (La. 1989) (adding that unless the mother’s husband
challenges the court’s decision, he will become the child’s legal father).
47. See id. (stating the potential benefits in having fathers who serve different roles
in a child’s life, such as the benefit obtained when a genetic father can educate his child
about his or her family history and the benefit obtained when a social father actively
and enthusiastically parents a child).
48. See id. at 854 (holding that even though the biological father shares
responsibility for a child with another man, the biological father is not exempted from
his support obligations).
49. Id. (specifying the child’s financial necessity in this case as the reason for the
unfair requirement that both men pay child support).
50. See, e.g., Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 3, 1996) (listing potential modern family arrangements as including biological
parents, adoptive parents, homosexual couples, grandparents, and step-parents).
51. See Miller, supra note 38, at 638 (arguing that California’s parentage laws are
outdated because they have not evolved beyond their roots in a time when it was
impossible to determine parentage with scientific certainty); see also Jacobs, supra note
45, at 813, 853 (asserting that when courts strictly adhere to a two-parent paradigm,
they exclude the less traditional types of families that are increasingly common).
Louisiana represents a positive example of a state that changed its laws when society’s
“typical family” changed. Id.
52. See Suzanne E. Rowe, Legal Research, Legal Writing, and Legal Analysis:
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1. By Awarding Judges Excessive Discretion or Allowing Them to Take
No Action in Paternity Disputes, Some Legislatures Fail to Properly
Consider Children’s Best Interests
By permitting judges to opt out of deciding paternity disputes at their
discretion, some legislatures fail to apply the best interests standard and
therefore fail to adequately protect children involved in disputes.53 The
United Kingdom drafted the Children Act 1989 under the strong preference
that families resolve their difficulties without a court’s interference
whenever possible.54 In practice, however, the United Kingdom’s
preference for non-intervention results in devoting a small amount of time
to a particular child’s case, which contradicts the stated objective of the
Children Act 1989 to serve the interests of every child as comprehensively
as possible.55 While the policy of discouraging court intervention might
encourage parents to resolve their personal difficulties independently and
without the court’s opinion, courts that fail to intervene in a paternity
dispute ignore the best interests standard.56 Just as parental conflict harms
children by distracting a parent and diverting his attention away from his
child, devoting a miniscule amount of time to each child’s situation in a
paternity dispute is inconsistent with maintaining the interests of that child
as paramount because children’s needs can be overlooked.57
Furthermore, unlike situations in which parties actively seek out and
receive court intervention in resolving disputes, the United Kingdom’s nonintervention policy amounts to a denial of parties’ requests for court
assistance.58 By instigating a civil motion to resolve a paternity dispute,
parties demonstrate that they want courts to make a decision regarding the
Putting Law School Into Practice, 29 STETSON L. REV. 1193, 1196 (2000) (implying
that up-to-date laws are more useful than outdated laws).
53. See In re S, [2002] UKHL 10, [2002] 2 A.C. 291, 304 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.) (reiterating the principle that courts should not intervene into family
matters unless absolutely necessary to prevent harm to children).
54. See id. at 292 (referencing the “cardinal principle” that while local authorities
are occasionally permitted to intervene in family matters, courts may not pass judgment
on local authorities’ decisions unless failing to do so would clearly harm children).
55. See Trinder & Lamb, supra note 32, at 1525 (citing study results finding that
the vast majority of district judges spent five minutes or less reading an entire family
law case file, and in only one out of nearly four-hundred cases did the court exercise
the powers granted to it by the Children Act by ordering a welfare report).
56. See id. at 1525-26.
57. See id. at 1513 (describing the harm that befalls children when their parents are
in conflict with one another, particularly aggression and behavior problems).
58. Compare Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948) (suggesting that courts be
made available to parties who, if they desire court interference, actively seek their
assistance in resolving discriminatory situations), with Lancashire CC v. B. (2000) 2
W.L.R. 590, 591-92 (H.L.) (Eng.) (noting the minimum circumstances that must be
present in a family law case for a court to even contemplate intervention and implying
a strong preference for non-intervention in family situations).
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familial situation that would most benefit their children.59 United Kingdom
judges who refrain from hearing paternity cases, therefore, fail to serve the
best interests of the children involved in the disputes because they leave the
family in the same situation it was in when it initially sought court
assistance.60
Furthermore, the U.K. legislature forces courts and local judicial
authorities to place considerable weight on the parents’ wishes when
determining what constitutes the best interests of a child, while
simultaneously acknowledging that conflicts created by the parents often
cause the family to turn to courts in the first place.61 This inconsistency
demonstrates the United Kingdom’s failure to properly consider children’s
best interests by affording judges great discretion in determining whether to
intervene in family matters and by allowing them to consider a parent’s
unreasonable wishes to the potential detriment of children involved in
paternity disputes.62
On the opposite end of the spectrum of court involvement in family
matters, California’s statutes create a convoluted, confusing, and expansive
role for the courts.63 The mixture of overlapping conclusive and rebuttable
presumptions muddles the role that courts should play.64 If a court adheres
to the conclusive presumption, the court is not able to use wide discretion
in determining parentage because it is required to name one man as the
father. This was demonstrated in In re Elijah V., where the appellate court
held that the trial court erred in ordering blood tests because it should have

59. See generally Mason v. Fuelburg, No. H-06-2424, 2007 WL 2220965, at *2
(S.D. Tex. July 31, 2007) (implying that parties enter into civil suits in order to receive
a judgment from the courts regarding which outcome the court believes is preferable).
60. See Martin v. Saint Mary’s Dep’t Soc. Servs., 346 F.3d 502, 506 (4th Cir.
2003) (suggesting that courts try to improve familial situations when troubled families
enter the legal system).
61. See Regina (G) v. Barnet London Borough Council, [2003] UKHL 57, [2004] 2
A.C. 208, 214.
62. See In re L, [2001] 2 W.L.R. 339, 359 (A.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.)
(recognizing the tremendous impact that a parent’s wishes have upon a judge when
determining what constitutes the best interests of a child, even if that parent does not
want her child to receive a helpful service, such as a psychiatric evaluation).
63. Compare David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions
Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L.
125, 139-40 (2006) (stating California’s requirement that when presumptions conflict,
judges must apply the one holding the weightier considerations of policy and logic, and
subsequently arguing that this drastically expands the court’s role), with Miller, supra
note 38, at 638-39 (describing the confusion resulting from the fact that the conclusive
presumption of paternity is actually rebuttable and implying that this confusion leads to
varying interpretations of the judiciary’s role).
64. See Miller, supra note 38, at 642 (arguing that California family law has been
characterized by uncertainty, the need for judges to fill in legal gaps left by that
uncertainty, and criteria for determining who ought to be a parent that are difficult for
courts to implement).
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applied the conclusive presumption, which would have provided the
answer to the paternity question without requiring biological proof.65
Accordingly, absent evidence of a genetic link, courts are bound by the
presumption to name the mother’s husband as the legal father of her
child.66
On the other hand, if a court adheres to the rebuttable presumption
modeled on the UPA, it has greater leeway in ascertaining the legal father
because it can choose to accept or reject offered evidence of paternity.67
Statutory presumptions exist to guide judges’ rulings, and herein lies the
flaw in California’s system of weighing conflicting presumptions: judges
are utilizing a vague standard to weigh which presumption they think the
legislature intended them to use.68 This creates a conflict in the checks and
balances system and obscures the purpose of statutory presumptions.69
Furthermore, California judges can now utilize great discretion when
choosing who to award custody by examining a variety of relevant factors,
such as quality of care-giving and marital status, instead of by adhering to a
statutory presumption.70
For example, the case of Steven W. v. Matthew S.—in which one man,
Matthew, was presumed conclusively to be a child’s father and another
man, Steven, was presumed rebuttably to have fathered the child—
illustrates the great discretion that judges may use when applying or not
applying presumptions.71 Because the two presumptions conflicted, the
65. 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774, 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that the biological
proof exception to the conclusive presumption did not apply to the man in question
because he was not a presumed father, and therefore, the lower court should have
applied the conclusive presumption without ordering a DNA test).
66. See generally Kusior v. Silver, 354 P.2d 657, 660 (Cal. 1960) (remarking on
the strength of conclusive presumptions, their resilience to contradictory evidence, and
typical instructions to juries to ignore such evidence).
67. See Gabriel P. v. Suedi D., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 437, 441 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
68. See Jennifer Giordano-Coltart, Walking the Line: Why the Presumption Against
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Patent Law Should Limit the Reach of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f), 2007 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4, 31 (outlining the procedure that courts should
undergo to determine whether a legislatively-created presumption should be applied,
including searching a presumption’s legislative history for evidence of congressional
intent).
69. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1223 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a conclusive
presumption as a statutory rule calling for a certain outcome regardless of any contrary
evidence); see also Hall v. Taylor (In re Estate of Cornelious), 674 P.2d 245, 247 (Cal.
1984) (describing the conclusive presumption as a codification of the principle of nonintervention by the courts in family matters).
70. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 13-14 (Cal. 2004) (reasoning that in cases where
multiple men qualify as potential parents, judges should weigh considerations of policy
and logic to determine which man would make the best parent). This reduces the
influence of the biological factor from paramount to simply another consideration to be
weighed against others, and implicitly granting courts greater power in determining
parentage. Id.
71. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 538-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that two men, the
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statute required the court to apply a balancing test, weighing considerations
of policy and logic, to determine which presumption controlled.72
Steven W. demonstrates the absurdity of codifying both conclusive and
rebuttable presumptions when a balancing test exists to determine which
applies: the balancing test, as applied in California, simply restates the best
interests of the child standard.73 Ultimately, the court simply concluded
that the rebuttable presumption controlled because Steven acted more like a
father to the child than Matthew, and therefore the child’s best interests
would be better served by placing the child with Steven.74 If legislativelycreated presumptions are reduced to a judge’s determination of who would
best parent the child—a conclusively-presumed father or a rebuttablypresumed father—then presumptions are rendered useless; the judge might
as well not consider any presumptions and simply rule on what
arrangement promotes the child’s best interests.
Like the miners in Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, who suffered health
consequences when confusing presumptions obscured their understanding
of legal remedies available to them, children’s best interests suffer when
legislatures require courts to weigh conflicting and confusing presumptions
without adequate legislative guidelines.75 Therefore, a proper standard
considers a child’s best interests by either allowing only one presumption
to exist without the presence of the other presumption, or by creating a
clear hierarchy of presumptions in order to minimize judicial confusion and
encourage uniformity.76
Even if the weighing test for presumptions is not completely
unnecessary, it certainly is outdated.77 The drafters of the most recent UPA
noted in their commentaries that the UPA included a weighing test for
conflicting presumptions, but the drafters removed it when writing the
child’s mother’s husband and the child’s biological father, were presumed fathers under
the conclusive and rebuttable presumptions, respectively).
72. See id.
73. Compare id. at 537-38 (reasoning that the child’s best interests precluded
implementation of the conclusive presumption, resulting in the court awarding Steven
guardianship of the child), with BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 170 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining “best interests of the child” as a determination of what guardianship
arrangement would best suit a child’s needs).
74. See Steven W., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539 (holding that the policy interests in
maintaining existing father-son relationships required Steven to be the child’s legal
father).
75. See 488 U.S. 105, 110, 129 (1988) (arguing that when presumptions are
confusing, mistakes occur on the parts of judges and parties alike, and implying that
legislatures must avoid drafting presumptions that lead to such confusion).
76. See, e.g., Gainey v. Flemming, 279 F.2d 56, 59 (10th Cir. 1960).
77. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(b) cmt. (2002) (noting language changes between
the two versions of the UPA, including elimination of weighing conflicting
presumptions).
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newer version.78 As a result, California has reverted to language used in an
outdated version that since has been discredited and discarded by the
writers of the UPA due to its irrelevance.79 By retaining language that the
more recent UPA’s drafters removed years ago, California has responded
inadequately to societal changes that the drafters of the most recent UPA
observed and considered when writing it. Consequently, California has
failed to protect children’s best interests.80
Arguments that California has distorted the true purpose of the UPA by
modifying its guidelines before incorporating them into state laws are
inaccurate because such modification is critical to maintaining the strong
role of state governments in regulating family law.81 The UPA provides
guidelines for states that could be adopted or abandoned. If a state chooses
to use the UPA as the basis for creating its own laws that are tailored to the
particular needs of its citizens, then that state is incorporating the best of
both worlds.82 Such a state can take advantage of a widely tested and
researched model act while simultaneously adding its own twist to the UPA
and thereby retaining as much control as possible over the outcome of
family law cases.83 Therefore, criticism of states that tweak the UPA to
better fit their needs is unwarranted.84

78. Id. (declaring the removal of the language regarding weightier considerations
of policy and logic as one of the more substantial and fundamental changes found in
the current UPA).
79. Id. (noting the development of modern genetic testing as the reason behind
removing the original language in the UPA regarding weighing considerations of
policy and logic).
80. See Rowe, supra note 52, at 1196.
81. See Meyer, supra note 63, at 140 (arguing that California courts are interpreting
the UPA in ways that were never intended by the statute’sUPA’s drafters, and asserting
that the novel interpretation dramatically extends the original understanding of the
judicial role found in the UPA).
82. In re Cornelious, 674 P.2d 245, 247-48 (Cal. 1984).
83. See, e.g., State Dep’t of Health & Welfare ex rel. Oregon v. Conley, 971 P.2d
332, 335 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (mentioning that out of the eighteen states that adopted
the UPA, three chose not to require courts to appoint an indigent defendant counsel,
and implying that the UPA affords states wide discretion in choosing which model
clauses to adopt and which to ignore).
84. See In re Cornelious, 674 P.2d at 247-48.
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2. State Laws and Courts That Fail to Consider Detailed and
Comprehensive Lists of Factors, Including Children’s Wishes and Potential
Fathers’ Actions, as Significant Elements in Their Paternity
Determinations Harm Children’s Best Interests
States that fail to consider detailed, comprehensive lists of factors when
determining a child’s paternity fail to consider that child’s best interests.85
The United Kingdom properly considers children’s best interests through a
novel method: it focuses on “parental responsibility,” which emphasizes
parents’ actions instead of simply marital status and better protects the
interests of the child.86 Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s legislature
drafted a strongly-worded list of factors for courts to evaluate, which
ensures that children’s best interests are paramount considerations in
courts’ parentage decisions.87 Among the factors listed by the legislature
for consideration are the wishes of the child, viewed in light of his age and
ability to understand his situation.88 A number of courts recognize the
importance of children’s input in legal matters that ultimately affect them
more than the adults involved, particularly in situations in which a child has
the capacity and maturity to voice a logical opinion regarding his or her
own future accommodations.89 Just as potential policy changes require
input from the public who will be most affected by those changes,
children’s input also is required in matters in which they will be affected
most.90 By codifying these factors, the Children Act 1989 ensures

85. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 134 (2007) (suggesting factors to consider,
such as the living arrangements at each potential parent’s home).
86. See Lowe, supra note 33, at 267-69 (describing the changes made by the
Children Act 1989, especially the novel concept of parental responsibility replacing the
former language of parental rights and duties, implying that parents have a primary
obligation to care for their children, not to simply have access to them).
87. See Margaret Ryznar, Note, Adult Rights as the Achilles’ Heel of the Best
Interests Standard: Lessons in Family Law From Across the Pond, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1649, 1661 (2007).
88. See Children Act 1989, c. 41, § 1(3) (Eng.) (listing the other factors to consider:
(1) the physical, emotional, and educational needs of the child; (2) the presence of any
predictable effects on the child due to a change in his situation; (3) potentially relevant
characteristics, such as age, sex, and background of the child; (4) the presence of past,
existing, and likely harm to the child; (5) the capability of his or her parents and other
relevant people of meeting the needs of the child; and (6) the powers available to the
judges under the Children Act in the particular situation).
89. See Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital
Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 569 (2000) (explaining that
children’s interests are overlooked frequently during intense battles between parents,
and arguing that children should be joined as a party in custody disputes in order to
ensure that courts consider their wishes).
90. See, e.g., Thames Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247, 267
(1st Cir. 2003) (identifying the lack of public input regarding a major change in the
Coast Guard’s rescue, safety, and salvage operations at sea as a reason for rejecting the
new policy).
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consideration of children’s best interests.91
By contrast, Louisiana’s dual paternity laws do not reflect the same
degree of concern for the wishes of children as the United Kingdom’s
Children Act 1989.92 Like the United Kingdom, Louisiana codified a list of
factors for courts to consider when determining what constitutes the best
interests of a child, including the reasonable wishes of a mature child, the
capacity of each potential parent or party to give the child love and
affection, and the child’s continued education and development.93 Unlike
the list codified in the Children Act 1989, Louisiana’s factors are loosely
worded and are intended explicitly to be guidelines for judges, not steadfast
formulas.94 The list’s structure renders it susceptible to the judge’s will,
who may evaluate the factors or ignore them as he sees fit.95
As further evidence of how Louisiana’s list of factors is non-binding on
judges, the Walker v. Walker court held that judges are not required to
report the specific ways in which they balanced the factors in each case;
rather, they merely are encouraged to do so for the sake of transparency.96
Indeed, at least one court outright dismissed the list of factors codified by
the legislature in Article 134 as a “laundry list” that did not need to be
examined with regard to the particular case at hand, and that court’s
holding was upheld on appeal.97 While trial judges receive significant

91. Ryznar, supra note 87, at 1661.
92. Compare Children Act § 1(3) (singling out a particular list of factors that courts

shall consider whenever faced with any decision regarding what constitutes the best
interests of a child, including the child’s ascertainable wishes), with LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 134 (2007) (listing a similar set of factors to consider, including the
reasonable wishes of a comparatively mature child, but using softer language such as
“may include” when describing how a court shall go about ascertaining the best
interests, which implies that the court does not have to consider the factors listed).
93. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 134 (listing several other factors, including: (1) the
length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability
of allowing the child to remain in that environment; (2) the moral fitness of each
potential parent or party, insofar as it affects the well-being of the child; (3) the ability
of each potential parent or party to provide the child with material needs such as food,
clothing, and medical care; and (4) each potential parent’s willingness and ability to
facilitate a close and continuing relationship between the child and others who wish to
become the child’s parent).
94. Compare id. (noting that courts shall consider all relevant factors when
determining the best interests of the child and permitting judges to only consider the
listed factors if they choose to take them into account), with Children Act 1989 § 1(3)
(leaving out any notion that judges are free to disregard the factors if they so choose).
95. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 134 (requiring further that the wishes of a child of
proper age be reasonable, which allows judges to dismiss the wishes of a mature
teenager simply because the judge disagrees with him or her).
96. 880 So. 2d 956, 960 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
97. See Luplow v. Luplow, 924 So. 2d 1135, 1143-44 (La. Ct. App. 2006)
(expressing regret that the trial court failed to consider the Article 134 factors when
making its custody decision, but nonetheless deferring to its ruling because the trial
court had the unique opportunity to observe the witness’ testimony first hand).
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discretion in determining what constitutes the best interests of a child,
judges are not permitted to disregard factors that the state legislature
enacted to guide their evaluations, yet the Luplow judge effectively
overlooked the Article 134 factors by dismissing them as optional.98
Courts that fail to consider not only the children’s input, but also an
alleged father’s overt and observable actions, fail to properly consider
children’s best interests because they inadequately determine whether an
alleged father would make a suitable parent.99 Because courts are free to
take away the privileges associated with fatherhood, it follows that men in
contested paternity situations have to earn those privileges through
demonstrated capability to parent.100 However, one scholar notes that
under the most recent UPA, unmarried fathers who behave like married
fathers by raising their children in their own homes and by holding them
out to society as their own offspring are vulnerable nonetheless to attack on
their parenthood status for the rest of their lives.101
This result runs counter to the most recent UPA’s insistence that married
and unmarried couples’ children are treated as equally as possible in
paternity disputes.102 Furthermore, this policy runs contrary to the best
interests of the children standard because it does not consider whether the
biological father or the social father would make the best parent; instead, it
simply assumes that a married man is suited better to raise children.103

98. Bynog v. Bynog, 663 So. 2d 86, 89 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that judges
may neither disregard factors nor unduly emphasize one factor at the expense of
others).
99. See Susan H. v. Jack S., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that actual relationships between the child and his presumed father are more
telling than biological connections and that such a relationship is more important to the
child than a biological relationship consisting of only genetic paternity).
100. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) (holding specifically
that an adulterous father had no fundamental right to visit his biological child and
generally that visitation privileges are not part of our conception of ordered liberty, and
therefore, they are not fundamental rights).
101. Glennon, supra note 89, at 569 (noting that there is no statute of limitations
limiting the time during which one may bring a paternity action against an unwed but
presumed father).
102. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 202 cmt. (2002) (describing the new UPA’s
preference to not distinguish on the grounds of marital status by referencing the
original UPA, which did treat the children of married couples differently from the
children of unmarried couples in paternity proceedings).
103. See Glennon, supra note 89, at 577.
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B. When States Permit Dual Paternity, They Fail to Protect Children’s Best
Interests Because Dual Paternity Favors the Unwed Father’s Interests
Over the Child’s
By failing to balance the biological father’s rights against competing
concerns, Louisiana fails to protect children’s best interests because it
allows a man with a potentially small interest in the child’s well-being to
have rights that courts typically only assign to the legal father.104 In dual
paternity situations, the unwed biological father’s interest in attaining legal
rights regarding his genetic child exists simultaneously and frequently
clashes with other important interests, such as the child’s interests, the
state’s interests and intact families’ interests. Generally, when multiple
significant interests compete and all cannot prevail simultaneously,
Supreme Court precedent strongly suggests that courts should utilize a
balancing test to determine which competing interest prevails.105 In
paternity cases specifically, courts acknowledge that a biological unwed
father’s interests can conflict with other interests, including his child’s best
interests, that these often cannot exist simultaneously, and that they must be
balanced to determine which one prevails.106
A biological unwed father enjoys some sort of interest in participating in
his child’s future, but that interest has not been recognized for very long
nor is it generally accepted.107 The question of whether or not a
constitutionally protected liberty interest safeguards the relationship a
biological unwed father shares with his children severely divided the
Michael H. court.108 When evaluating the case, five justices refused to
eliminate the possibility that a biological unwed father would ever attain a
liberty interest, protected by the Constitution, in having a relationship with
104. See T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So. 2d 873, 879 (La. 1999) (Knoll, J., concurring)
(arguing that children’s interests are protected best not when courts ignore biological
unwed fathers’ rights in favor of procedural distractions, but when courts hold hearings
to determine whether these purported fathers do, in fact, hold substantive rights strong
enough to outweigh competing interests); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,
262 (1983) (finding that unless an unwed biological father accepts at least some
parental responsibility, the state is under no constitutional obligation to listen to his
views on his child’s best interests because he lacks a liberty interest in the father-child
relationship).
105. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
106. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254-55 (1978) (finding that while
an unwed biological father enjoyed some substantive rights to a relationship with his
child, the child’s best interests clashed with the father’s rights and ultimately
outweighed them, because the two rights could not co-exist).
107. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (deeming the right to conceive
and to raise one’s child an essential and basic civil right of man). But see Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 111 (1989) (ruling that Michael had failed to demonstrate that
his interest as an unwed biological father was embedded so deeply in our society’s
history as to be called a fundamental right).
108. See generally Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123-24.
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his child whose mother was living with her husband when the child was
conceived and born.109 Five justices noted the procedural flaw in a
conclusive presumption that eliminates a constitutionally-protected interest
without a hearing.110 Four justices argued that a biological, unwed father
had a constitutionally-protected interest in developing a relationship with
his child; one assumed the truth of the preceding argument.111 Moreover, a
biological unwed father’s interests are weakened further by the fact that his
biological tie with his child is neither necessary nor sufficient on its own to
preserve the father’s parental rights.112
After identifying the nature of the biological unwed father’s interest, the
balancing test requires identifying the interests that compete with those of
the biological unwed father.113 One competing interest is the state’s
interest in preserving intact marriages and the benefits that accompany
them.114 Courts have long recognized this interest and placed it on par with
other significant state concerns.115 By allowing an outsider to contest the
paternity of a child who is a member of an intact marital family, such as in
dual paternity situations, courts infringe upon the state’s recognized
interest.116
A second competing interest belongs to the child, who has a strong
interest in growing up within a stable family structure composed of the
parents with whom he or she becomes familiar.117 When a biological
unwed father claims paternity of a child who already has a legal father

109.
110.
111.
112.

See id. at 163.
See id.
See id.
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (requiring a biological father to do
more than simply provide genetic material if he wants to establish a relationship with
his child, and suggesting that the father accept responsibility and seize the opportunity
to prove his worthiness, implying that his rights are not inherent and must be earned
through his actions).
113. See T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So. 2d 873, 877 (La. 1999) (Knoll, J., concurring)
(arguing that the majority should have balanced the biological father’s interests with
competing interests because if the court determines that the father has a significant
constitutionally-protected interest, then that interest cannot be ignored).
114. See id. at 878.
115. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 111 (citing the state interest in preserving the marital
unit as one that society traditionally has protected against claims by outsiders
challenging paternity); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (likening the marital institution to national security in that
both are legitimate state interests).
116. See T.D., 730 So. 2d at 878 (Knoll, J., concurring) (implying that the biological
father in this case might have been able to assert his paternity had the child’s mother
not been married, because no marital unit would exist that requires state protection).
117. See Staten v. Brown, 940 So. 2d 105, 110 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (identifying that
interest as the reason why the Louisiana legislature incorporated time limits for when a
hopeful father can bring a paternity claim).
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because of a marital family unit, he disrupts the child’s stable family life.118
Finally, the marital family has a legitimate interest in maintaining a
private realm that the state cannot enter without a compelling reason.119 In
Finnerty v. Boyett, the court recognized that the state cannot force another
person to encroach on an intact marital family because it would violate that
family’s right to remain free from state intrusion.120 Such disruption also
violates family rights of integrity and privacy by permitting outsiders to
enter into the family realm.121
Unlike the family’s interest in protection from unnecessary state
intrusion, the state’s interest in protecting the marital family from outsider
intrusion, and the child’s interest in a stable family life, the biological
father’s interest does not exist on its own accord.122 Because the father
must also demonstrate that he accepted responsibility for his child in order
for the court to have reason to preserve his right to a relationship with his
child, his interest is subordinate to other competing interests.123 Therefore,
Louisiana fails to act in the child’s best interests by allowing a man to
receive paternity rights at the expense of other important interests that
strongly affect children and outweigh his own interests.124
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION: LEGISLATURES SHOULD GUIDE JUDGES
BY SUPPLYING CLEAR LISTS OF FACTORS TO CONSIDER, AND JUDGES
SHOULD BOTH SPEND MORE TIME REVIEWING PATERNITY CASES AND
AVOIDING JUDICIAL BIAS
The availability of comprehensive, thoughtful paternity laws affecting
unwed fathers and their children is becoming more and more crucial with
the increasing number of contested paternity cases.125 Furthermore,
118. See id.
119. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
120. 469 So. 2d 287, 289-90 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (agreeing with the trial court’s

determination that allowing the biological father to “intrude” into the child’s existing
and stable family life would disrupt the family and fail to promote the child’s best
interests).
121. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 111 (1989).
122. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (suggesting that while the
biological father-child relationship is unique, the state is not obligated to provide a
forum in which the biological father can assert his claim to paternity unless he
demonstrated a willingness to accept parental responsibility).
123. See id. at 248 (holding that the Constitution does not compel a state to listen to
a biological unwed father’s opinion of what serves his child’s best interests, unless that
father has taken responsibility for the child, and implying that the child’s best interests
are more significant than the father’s interests).
124. See Staten v. Brown, 940 So. 2d 105, 109 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (recounting a
previous opinion, which held that the balance tips in favor of preserving the marital
unit and therefore against unwed biological fathers’ interests).
125. See Julie Davidow, Home Tests Go Beyond Pregnancy and Glucose,
BRADENTON HERALD, Apr. 20, 2006, at 16 (noting the Genelex company’s claim that
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paternity cases are becoming more complex due to scientific developments
in procreation and surrogacy.126 In order to ensure that the best interests of
children are met in these complicated cases, state legislatures should
reconsider their existing paternity laws.127
First, state legislatures should verify that they have codified a
comprehensive, detailed, non-exhaustive list of factors, such as Louisiana’s
list, that judges must consider when evaluating every case that affects a
child’s interests.128 Such a list should consider potential parents’ abilities
to provide proper homes for the children, including: (1) their capability of
giving the children love and affection and continuing the children’s
education and development; (2) their ability to provide the children with
material needs such as food, clothing, and medical care; (3) the current
existence of love, affection, and any other relevant emotional ties, between
each potential parent and the children; (4) the moral fitness of each
potential parent or party, insofar as it affects the child’s well-being; (5) the
degree and extent of responsibility for the care and rearing of the child
previously exercised by each party; (6) the willingness and ability of each
potential parent or party to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing
relationship between the child and others who wish to become the child’s
parent; and (7) each potential parent or party’s physical and mental health,
insofar as it affects children’s well-being.129
Furthermore, the list should incorporate guidelines that judges must use
when considering the appropriateness of the environment in which the
children would be raised under each potential family structure, including:
(1) the length of time during which the child has lived in a stable, adequate
environment, and the desirability of allowing the child to remain in that
environment; (2) the permanence, insofar as it constitutes a family unit, of
the existing or proposed home or homes in which the child is to be raised;
(3) the child’s social history, in particular that of his home, school, and
sales of its home DNA testing kit have increased by three-hundred percent since
September 2002, with 2,300 kits purchased).
126. See, e.g., Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (introducing a case involving multiple potential parents of a child,
due to a married couple’s in vitro fertilization of an unrelated surrogate mother).
127. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (2002) (explaining the
reasoning behind creating a new UPA as resting on the changes that have occurred
since the inception of the first UPA, such as technological and scientific developments
and changes in family structures).
128. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 134 (2007) (providing an example of such a list,
noting that judges should be given discretion in weighing the factors, describing the
above list as comprehensive but not exhaustive, and recommending that judges
consider other factors if they deem other factors to be relevant).
129. See id. art. 134 rev. cmt. a (noting that these factors are not intended to direct
parents’ conduct, but simply to serve as a basis for determining which arrangement best
suits the child).
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community; and (4) the distance between the homes of the parties.130
Finally, if the children involved are old enough to formulate mature and
expressive opinions regarding their future, courts should consider their
reasonable wishes. 131
In cases of contested paternity in particular, legislatures should expand
the list to include a specific provision for consideration of the overt and
observable actions of both mothers and fathers as evidence of their intent
and desire to parent.132 This would require a potential legal father to prove
that he has taken specific steps, such as attempting to spend time with his
child or taking him to the doctor, while ensuring that courts evaluate
mothers and fathers on more equal grounds.133
The roles played by judges in paternity cases must be evaluated carefully
because, too often, legislatures create statutes designed to guide judges,
only to have the judges disregard the factors in favor of an overly casespecific analysis.134 This allows judicial bias to enter intensely debated
situations like unwed fatherhood.135
While both legislation and appellate courts should encourage all judges
to spend a sufficient amount of time reviewing contested paternity cases,
legislatures must also be careful not to infringe on the autonomy of judges
by codifying the amount of time they should spend reviewing a case.136
One solution would permit varying levels of judicial deference in cases
depending on the amount of time each judge spends on a particular case.
Judges who devote more time to reviewing a case would receive broad
130. See id. art. 134 rev. cmt. h (elaborating on negative consequences from poor
home environments after court decisions are made, including the impracticality of
visitation arrangements).
131. See id. art. 134 rev. cmt. g.
132. Lowe, supra note 33, at 268-69 (describing introduction of the novel concept of
parental responsibility in the Children Act 1989, which replaced the former language of
parental rights and duties, and noting that parental responsibility is a significant factor
to be considered when determining whether an adult would make a competent parent).
133. See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 285 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998) (describing previous cases in which courts have examined whether a
biological father took active steps, such as participating in Lamaze classes and referring
to the child as “ours,” to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility for his child in
determining whether he should be afforded rights equal to the mother’s rights).
134. Luplow v. Luplow, 924 So. 2d 1135, 1143-44 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (expressing
regret that the trial court dismissed the Article 134 factors and referred to them as a
“laundry list” when making its custody decision).
135. See Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex “Marriage” Through Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1719 (1997) (noting the extreme judicial bias observed in
situations involving same-sex marriage, another highly emotional topic, and describing
several cases that resulted in absurd rulings by blatantly homophobic judges).
136. See Shawnee Tribe v. United States, 423 F.3d 1204, 1217 (10th Cir. 2005)
(holding that separation of powers prevents Congress from commanding a court to
reach a particular result).
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judicial deference from higher courts if that case is appealed, and those
who choose to spend a smaller amount of time on cases would have their
opinions reviewed more carefully by the higher courts.137 This policy
would allow appellate courts who observe trial court judges spending too
little time on cases or disregarding statutory lists of factors to operate under
a lower standard of judicial deference, and it would encourage lower court
judges to spend more time on family law cases.138
States should also review their statutory paternity presumptions to ensure
that they do not overlap.139 If such overlap is unavoidable, then the
legislature should incorporate a detailed weighing system for the judges to
follow.140 Detailed weighing systems are important to ensure the uniform
application of presumptions and therefore uniform outcomes in best
interests of the child cases.141
V. CONCLUSION
Children undoubtedly are harmed the most when issues arise concerning
their fathers’ identities.142 While courts maintain a common standard when
handling custody debates—the best interests of the child standard—wide
variance among judges, courts, states, and countries reveals vastly different
ways of interpreting what constitutes best interests.143 To properly
safeguard the best interests of children, judges must carefully examine each
case, but can neither receive too much discretion or deference, else they
will inject their personal beliefs into controversial family situations.144
Legislatures must also ensure that judges spend appropriate time reviewing
cases that strongly affect children.145 Finally, legislatures can provide
137. See Trinder & Lamb, supra note 32, at 1525.
138. See Luplow, 924 So. 2d at 1144 (noting that a more thorough articulation of the

trial court’s reasoning would have been desirable and helpful).
139. See, e.g., In re Jesusa V., 85 P.2d 2, 11 (Cal. 2004).
140. See, e.g., T.R.W., Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 33 (2001) (describing a
carefully-worded exception to a rule created by Congress, and implying that
incorporating such careful terminology in legislation results in the courts following
congressional intent).
141. See Richard A. Warshak, Punching the Parenting Time Clock: The
Approximation Rule, Social Science, and the Baseball Bat Kids, 45 FAM. CT. REV 600,
612 (2007) (discussing the lack of uniformity when courts apply the best interests
standard and suggesting that courts adopt an alternative model).
142. Commonwealth v. Addicks, 2 Serg. & Rawle 174, 174 (Pa. 1815) (expressing
concern for the children involved in their parents’ divorce and implying that their wellbeing is more important than their parents’ well-being).
143. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2004) (describing the conclusive
presumption of paternity), with Finnerty v. Boyett, 469 So. 2d 287, 293 (La. Ct. App.
1985) (recognizing Louisiana’s policy of permitting dual paternity in order to best
serve children’s interests).
144. See, e.g., Freshman, supra note 135, at 1719.
145. See Trinder & Lamb, supra note 32, at 1525.
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judges with the guidance they request by codifying clear and
comprehensive factors for judges to consider when evaluating the best
interests of children.146

146. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 134 (2007).
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